Different theoretical explanations have been developed for seemingly inconsistent actions that deal with varying levels of risk and time. We propose a simple model of utility that unifies these seemingly separate phenomena, while not departing too far from the standard models of utility maximization already in use. Our driving assumption is that preferences over riskier outcomes discontinuously depart from preferences under certainty; a jump from no risk to some risk is fundamentally different from a movement of some risk to more risk.
Introduction
Many different theoretical explanations of decision-making have been developed to characterize and judge experimental findings of bias as violations of standard utility theory.
Explanations have come in the form of the certainty effect (also called the Allais Paradox), immediacy effect (also called present-bias, dynamic inconsistency, or diminishing impatience), utility of gambling, non-expected utility, risk aversion, and prospect theory. Work by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) suggests that models of preferences should be adjusted to accommodate a discrete taste for the absence of any sort of risk, which appears to be large enough to be empirically detectable. We attempt to unite these concepts via a simple adaptation of expected utility theory.
Our value-added to literature is to propose that the presence of risk activates a discrete jump to a frame of mind that evaluates expected utility relative to some reference baseline. We implement this innovative idea in a model resembling a fusion of expected utility with quasihyperbolic utility, where the desired discrete jump is achieved via a discontinuity in the objective function at the boundary values of the probabilities. The inclusion of a discrete difference in riskless activities, relative to activities that include some positive level of risk, conveniently provides an efficient explanation of many experimental findings of bias.
We argue that all decisions begin with a binary choice: people either choose to take the action in question or not. To abstract away from the intellectual baggage that we carry from how economists have modelled risk, focus for a moment on the action to consume some good.
Consider, for example, the decision to consume alcohol. The individual first decides whether to consume a taste of alcohol. Then, in a second stage, the individual decides how much more alcohol to consume on the margin. Economists might describe this binary decision of whether to consume alcohol is made on a coarse (i.e. discrete) margin; yet, it may be viewed differently by the decision maker from the fine (i.e. continuous) margins of (infinitesimally) tiny tweaks in the quantity consumed. Hence, the decision from none to some may be qualitatively different than the step from some to more. Now apply that same logic to a risk averse decision maker who is considering bearing some risk; the disutility of going from no risk to some risk can be distinctly different than going from some risk to more risk.
It is instructive to apply our logic to a simple example in the literature. An individual choosing between $100 at time t and $110 at time t +1 chooses differently depending on the timing of these payments. When the decision is between $100 today and $110 in one month, people tend to choose $100 today. However, if the decision is between $100 in one year and $110 in one year and one month, most people choose the latter (see Friedman and Savage 1948 , Phelps and Pollak 1968 , Kahneman and Tversky 1979 , Laibson 1997 , O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999 , and Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter 2010 . While the gap in payments (one month) and the gap in pay ($10) remain constant, the risk level does not. Payment today involves a riskless decision, whereas, all the other options involve some non-zero level of risk (although the experimenters hope that their design makes later payments appear riskless, the fact that the participant leaves without the money in hand means that they likely believe there is a non-zero probability of non-payment). The initial movement from no risk to some risk is fundamentally different than the movement from some risk to more risk.
Model
We begin with a general specification of the decision maker's objective, as an (indirect) utility function (V) that is increasing in the wealth (W) owned in each of J states of nature (S):
Then we propose the following functional form:
Where U is a state-dependent utility function under certainty, W B denotes the amount of wealth which serves as a baseline for the decision-maker, and  (0,1] represents the penalty to the decision-maker from the presence of risk. 2 We immediately note three desirable properties about this specification. Hence, any phenomenon explained with quasi-hyperbolic discounting also explains our preferences that anchor expected utility to a reference baseline. The hyperbolic discounting parameter appears due to our model of a discrete jump in utility when moving from certainty (at the present) to uncertainty (of the future). In our model, the additional discounting of the future can give an intimately tied intuitive interpretation to disutility due to the mere presence of uncertainty in the future. Notice that, even when there is some fleetingly small risk, utility is a convex combination of the utility of a von Neumann Morgenstern Expected Utility maximizer and some baseline frame of reference to which this decision maker is tethered. The strength of that tether is determined by the magnitude of : the closer the parameter  for a decision maker is to 1, the closer the decision-maker is to being a pure von Neumann Morgenstern Expected Utility maximizer. The closer the parameter  for a decision maker is to 0, the closer the decision-maker is to appearing somewhat irrational relative to the von Neumann Morgenstern model. Our prior is that likely values for  will tend to be rather close to (albeit just less than) 1. To clearly illustrate the mechanics of this model of preferences, Figure 1 The green curve is a standard utility function under certainty. The blue horizontal line is the reference level of utility, which crosses the standard utility function at the point of reference (labeled W B ). Above this point, anchoring to the reference point makes the decision maker relatively more risk averse but less risk averse below this reference point. The blue curve is just the weighted average of the green curve and the horizontal blue line. The jump from uncertainty to certainty induces a discrete gain in utility above the reference point but a discrete drop in utility below the reference point. The standard graphical exercises can be conducted with any state dependent utility function (e.g. between an outcome yielding W L versus W H ), but one must then then anchor it to the reference level of utility. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , which famously used a sigmoidal shape. Thus, in some sense, our model could be seen as proposing a clever weighting function for prospect theory that nicely yields quasi-hyperbolic preferences. the presence of any risk clearly generates a discrete drop in utility. For amounts beneath the baseline reference, the presence of some risk can enhance utility. This feature can explain how gambling small amounts of money, so long as the amounts in question fall beneath the baseline reference, can actually enhance utility. Indeed, we intuitively conceptualized the reference level as the level beneath which there exists some risky gamble that would be preferred to a certain outcome with the same expected value. It is certainly conceivable that this reference baseline simpler form captured by hyperbolic discounting (i.e. the present versus the future), for reasons that we do not explore here.
Conclusion
Engaging in risky activities is inevitable. Virtually all decisions entail some level of risk; the ability to eliminate all risk is relatively rare and hence very valuable. We have constructed a parsimonious model that captures the discrete jump in utility from selecting a risk-free option.
With this discrete jump achieved via a discontinuity in the objective function at the boundary values of the probabilities, our model includes familiar features of both expected utility and quasi-hyperbolic utility (which are special cases). Our model provides a unifying and consistent explanation for a variety of anomalous behavior associated with behavioral biases: certainty effect, Allais Paradox, immediacy effect, present-bias, dynamic inconsistency, diminishing impatience, the utility of gambling, non-expected utility, and prospect theory. We encourage future researchers to refine our innovation, consider its application, and pursue estimation of its parameters.
